Product-Led Sales: Turning User Adoption Into Enterprise Deals

Our users adopted the product on their own. Why is that not turning into enterprise deals?

Andreessen Horowitz · Peter Lauten and Martin Casado

Published

Bottom-up adoption does not become an enterprise sale on its own. In their Growth+Sales essay for Andreessen Horowitz, Peter Lauten and Martin Casado describe the sequence that works. Users adopt first, and a sales team is layered on once those users start pulling for it. They name six ways the pairing fails, from forcing bottom-up adoption on a product that cannot support it to forgetting the users once sales takes off. The two motions have to reinforce each other, or you carry the cost of both and the benefit of neither.

When users love it and nobody buys

You can see the adoption. Engineers at a large company found the product, set it up themselves, and use it every week. A few of them expense it. Then you reach for the contract that should follow, the department deal or the enterprise agreement, and nothing moves.

The people using the product are not the people who buy it. Adoption earned you the users. It did not earn you the buyer.

Peter Lauten and Martin Casado, writing for Andreessen Horowitz, call the answer growth+sales. A bottom-up growth motion comes first, and a top-down sales motion is layered on later. In the growth motion the end user decides. They skip the analyst report and the pitch, and they judge the product only on whether it solves their problem. In the sales motion a team works the organization, the budget, security review, and procurement. Each motion is hard to run alone. Running both and keeping them in step is harder.

Their examples include GitHub, Slack, Zoom, Atlassian, and Twilio, all of which started bottom-up and added enterprise sales later. Twilio is the developer case they single out. It won developers on the quality of its technology, then made it easy for those developers to spend like an enterprise.

The useful part of their essay is less the pattern than the six ways it fails.

Six ways growth+sales breaks

Forcing a product into bottom-up adoption

Some products cannot be adopted by one person. If a product needs central IT to grant access to secure systems, or only works once a whole department migrates to it, a single user cannot start alone. Lauten and Casado say to confirm two things before building a motion around the user. The value has to be strong enough for a user to adopt on their own, and the setup light enough that they can.

Buying users who do not love the product

Paid acquisition can fill the funnel with users who never stick. It gets more expensive as you reach later adopters, who tolerate less. A sales team layered on top of lukewarm users gets lukewarm results. Their advice is to make sure users love the product before paying to acquire more of them.

Measuring with sales metrics

Revenue, seats, and logo counts can look healthy while most paid seats sit idle. That is churn waiting for the next renewal. They recommend tracking active users, engagement, retention, and conversion through the user journey, and watching how usage spreads inside a single customer.

Adding sales too early

Bring in sales before the organic motion matures and you end up with two pitches to two buyers, one who knows you and one who does not, with nothing connecting them. You carry the cost of both motions and get the benefit of neither. The signal that it is time comes from the users. They start asking how to get the product to their whole department, how to unlock the premium features, and whether you will talk to their IT team.

Growth that never reaches a buyer

Sometimes user adoption does not make the sale any easier. The users may never connect you to anyone with a budget, which the authors call a common dead end in open source. Or the free tier satisfies them so fully that nobody pays for more.

Forgetting the users once sales takes off

The last failure is the slow one. Deals close, the product stops improving, the experience falls behind, and users move to a newer tool. The authors frame the fix as keeping the promises made to users while making new ones to the buyer. Atlassian is their example. It kept adding products, and each one started a new round of bottom-up adoption inside customers it already had.

What to take from it

Treat the two motions as a sequence with a dependency. Sales works on momentum the users created. It cannot run ahead of that momentum, and it cannot let it stall.

Before adding sales, check three things. Can a user adopt the product without help? Are the users you have actually using it? Are they asking you to reach the rest of their department? If the answer to the last question is no, a sales hire is selling cold, and the adoption you already have is not doing the work it should.

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